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SUMMARY
The subject  of  th is study is  the inf luence of  l inguist ic  phi tosophy,
especially the philosophy of ordinary language, on thoughts about
educat ion.  Successively at tent ion ís paid to three theor ies of
education: the educational philosophy of wittgenstein and spiecker in
chapter I, the íkritisch-kommunikative pádagogik' in chapter II and
the philosophy of education of Hirst, rmerman, peters and scheffler in
chapteï rrr. chapter rv i-s meant as a start to folrow up investigation
aiming at the development of a pedagogically well-established curricu-
Ium.
onaDDer l
wi t tgenstei  n 's  0n certa intg inc ludes a concept of  chi ld rear ing and
education, which is reconstructed here. of central importance in this
concept is how chil-dren are traíned and learn to react, a process that
also resul ts in the acquis i t ion of  a wor ld-picture or  a system of
t ru isms. This v ie$r,  rathêr ímpl ic i t  in  wi t tqensteinrs epistemorogical
work, $ras turned into an expricit philosophy of education by the Dutch
philosopher of education spiecker. To justify this view they give the
epistemological  reason that  doubt,  knowredge and cr i t ic ism are possibre
only on a basis of  indubi table convict ions ( 'cer ta int ies ' )  that  are,  in
themselves, accepted without any ïeason. The context of this argrnnent
is the 'meaning as use'-theory, which is an epistemology as wel.L as a
theory of meaning. (euestions concerning these matters are studied
extensively in chapter  I I I . )
The concept of 'rure-governed behaviourÍ, which is interwoven with the
'meaning as use'- theory,  Ís  analyzed in sect ions 5,  6 and 7.  Winch
introduced th is concept as a basic category of  the socia l  sc iences,
whil-e spiecker - folrowing víinch - introduced it in the philosophy of
educat ion.  Both re ject  a behaviour ist ic ,  causal-explanatory science of
human conduct and ptead that social scientists should pay attention to
Lhe meaníng of human action. víinch equates rure-governed behaviour to
meaningful behaviour. In this category the dÍfference between
refrective and habituar behaviour disappears. rn consequence it is to
be doubted whether the concept contains the aspects of consciousness,
intentionality and rationality, that spiecker judges to be cruciar in
the philosophy of education.
Fol lowing Von Wright ,  we argue that  ' to fo l low a ru le '  and ' to have a
reason' are not to be equated, but aïe rather incompatible. If the concept
of  Íeducat ion'  is  equated to the acquis i t ion of  ru les,  then i t  is
connected with a process of learning that is better described in causar,
behaviour ist ic  terms than in terrns of  intent ionar i ty ,  etc. ,  as winch
and spiecker intended- rRule-governed behaviour' is not a suitable
category for the social_ sciences and the phitosophy of education.
wi t tgensteints concept of  'educat ïon' ,  however,  is  descr ibable wi thout
using the concept of  ' ru le ' .  rn consequence such a descr ipt ion d.oesnrt
imply any c la im to connect  'educat ion'  wi th , intent ional i ty ' ,
r rat ional i ty '  and 'cr i t ic ism' .  chapter  ï  ends in a refutat ion of  wi t t -
gensteinrs analysis of  ' to know'  -  that  is ,  a refuLat ion of  the
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epistemological  argument that  supports h is concept of  educat ion.  Thus
we made room for  a phi losophy of  educat ion in which rat ional i ty  and
iust i - f icat ion do r : lav a Dart .
cnaD te r  11
Thó ^Àhfrrr  ^^h^óh+ of  the 'kr i t isch-kommunikat ive pádaqoqikr  is  ,com_
municat ion '  or  ' in teract ionr.  This phi losophy of  educat ion was
developed, among others,  by Baacke,  Mol lenhauer,  Scháfer en Schal ler
fo l lowing through socio logi-cal  theor ies on socia l izat j_on.  The core of
f h ê c ê  t h ê ^ r i a c  i c  - i . v e n  i n  G . E .  M e a d ' s  d i c t u m ' Í t  s i m D l v  w o r k s  f r o m
the outs ide to the inside' .  Whether socia l - izat ion is  descr ibed in terns
of  ro le- theory or  Ín terms of  socio logy of  knowledge, in both cases
the  cen t ra l -  i dea  i s  t ha t  soc i a l  r ea l i t y  ( r o Ies ,  soc i a l  expec ta t i ons ,
the 'socia l  s tock of  knowledge')  is  internal ized by indiv iduals and
gives them ident i ty .  We point  out  that  the socio logical  and socia l -
psychological  use of  the concept ' in ternal izat ion '  tends to imply an
oversocia l ized concept of  man. Such theor ies of  socia l izat ion seem to
have di f f icul t ies in coping wi th the quest ion how people can develop
iden t i t y  i n  p l u ra l i s t i c  soc i e t i es ,  wh i ch  i nc l ude  seve ra l  r soc i a l
r e a l i . t i e s r ,
Th i s  ques t i on  can  be  answered  by  means  o f  t he  concep t ' I - i den t i t y '
( r I ch - I den t i t á t t  )  o f  c r i t i ca l  t heo r i es  o f  soc i a l i za t i on .  I - i den t i t y
di f fers f rom socia l  ident i ty :  i t  is  not  adopted f rom a certaÍn group,
but  i t  is  an ever anew gained.  bal-ance of  betonging to d ivergent groups
and becomíng a member of new groups, without submerging fully into one
of them. The internal izat ion of  norms of  coÍ inunicat ion and of  a wor ld-
v iew is no longer thought of  as the core of  socia l izat ion,  but  rather
the Ínternal izat j -on of  st ructures of  norm- and knowledge-gienerat ing
communicat ion,  which resul ts j -n the formal-  abi l i ty  to solve balance
problerns ever anew. The socia l  condi t ions of  such a development are
rea l i zed  i n  comp lex  soc ie t i es .
On pr incip le people are able to balance in the descr ibed manner because
of their  communicat ive competence.  This concept of  Habermas is used by
cr i t ical -communicat ive phi losophers of  educat ion as fo l lows:  educat ion
is communicat ion ( 'Kommunikat ives Handeln ' )  in which the chi ld 's
cornmunicat Íve competence is  ant ic ipated counterfactual ly .  In part ic ipa-
t ing in connunicat ion the chi ld develops these abi l - i t ies.  In th is
dÍadic concept of  educat ion,  so we conclude,  the speci f ic  educat ional
act iv i ty  is  resÈr icted to the creat ion of  st ructural  condi t ions of
communicatj-on, while furthermore communication has educational value in
i tsel f .  In th is manner t ine fornal  aspects of  communicat ion are exclusi -
vely emphasized.
We cr i t ic ize th is concept of  educat ion by making use of  more recent
ideas of  the cerman phi losopher Habermas himsel f .  Pedagogical ly  spoken,
i t  is  not  f ru i t fu l  to over-est imate the formal ,  ideal ized aspects of
comrnunicat ion,  as f i t t le  as i t  is  f ru i t fu l  to over-est imate the
certa int ies of  dai ly  l i fe (chapter  I )  .  CoÍÈining both aspects seems
more at t ract ive:  communicat ion is  rea] ized in actual  s i tuat ions in
which certa int ies become expl ic i t  and al -so rat ional l -y  debatable.  th is
combinat ion is  i l lustrated by our interpretat ion of  the phenomenon of
the 'h idden curr icul -um':  the denominat . ion for  adjustment processes that
238
can only be disposed of  their
and ref lect ion on socia l  proce
But then i t  is  necessary to ex
of  educat ion for  the c lassical
Chapter IfI
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sopher of  educat ion Imelman'  k
components of  educat ion,  only
educatÍon -  as a matter  of  rat
socÍal izat ion and indoctr inat i
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Iedge and experÍence is  a nece
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The essent ia l  condi t ion of  the
educat ion is  an epÍstemologY t
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That is why the nature of the
topic of  th is chapter .  Thi .s to
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In sect ion 4 the problem is d i
r e fe rence .  S ince  re fe r r i ng  i s
the meaning of  referr ing expre
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in more general  terms: Ianguag
Tlro condi t ions of  successful  r
and the cr i ter ion of  uniquenes
. r i f ê r i o n .  f h ê  s n e á k e r  S h o u l d
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a refe ience is  fu l ly  consunmat
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is by means of  that  knowledge
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Tn  scc f i on  5  t he  n rob lems  o f  t
and object  is  analysed.  A curr
'bel ief '  ( to be sure of  someth
something t rue) and ' rat ional
something true and to have rea
truth is  of  a correspondence-t
because of  i ts  inherent  unsolv
can onfy be disposed of Èheir sneaking power by explicit comnunication
and ref lect ion on socia l -  processes (at  schools as wel l  as e lsewhere).
But then it is necessary to exchange the diadic, conrnunicative concept
of education for the classical triadic concept.
Chapter III
fn a triadic philosophy of education as developed by the Dutch philo-
sopher of education Imelman, knowledge is one of the three structural
components of education. only if this component is acknowledged, can
education - as a matter of rationality - be distinguished from
socialization and indoctrination. A rational and critical attitude
cannot be deveJ-oped in a vacuumi to be on the inside of forms of know-
Iedqe and experj.ence is a necessary condition for the ability to reason
and to criticize in a rational way. Education does not aim at the ac-
quisition of certaj-nties, because of the ratj-onal nature of knowledge.
Developing rationality, i.e. the attitude of giving and asking for
reasons, rather demands the stimulation of uncertaintv concernins
acquired knowledge.
The essent ia l  condi t ion of  the possib i l i ty  of  th is t r iadic concept of
education is an epistemologry that, on the one hand, acknowledgres the
existence of reality independent of a knowing subject and, on the other
hand, acknowledges that al-1 knowledge is subjective and changeable.
That is why the nature of the relation language-reality is the central
topic of this chapter. This topic is elucidated from epistemological
angle and from the angle of the theory of meaning.
In section 4 the problem is discussed in the context of an analysis of
reference. Since referring is a kind of language-use, guestions about
the meaning of  referr ing expressions ( i .e. ,  expressions used in refer-
ring) nust be put in relation to the context of speech. The airn of
referr ing is  to ident i fy  an extra- l inguist ic  ent i ty  to say or  ask (etc.)
something about it. The referring use of expressions implies that the
linguistj-c expression and the intended referent are distinct. To put it
in more general terms: Ianguage and reality should not be confounded.
Two condi t ions of  successful  reference are the cr i ter ion of  existence
and the criterion of uniqueness of the referent. Searle added a third
criterion: the speaker should actua.LLA identify the referent to his
audience and thus he must be able to give - if requÍred - further
descriptions of the intended referent to succeed in this identification.
A reference is fully consurnmated if not only the speaker, but also hís
audience knows what or whom he is talking about. Therefore, some know-
ledqe of someÈhing is assumed in the referring use of langnrage and it
is by means of that knowledge that people can relate languaqe to the
world (something in the world) . Language and reality do not coincide,
but man can talk about reality by means of language.
In section 5 the problems of the epistemological gulf between subject
and object  is  analysed.  A current  analysis of  'knowledge'  d ist inguishes
' beL ie f '  ( t o  be  su re  o f  some th ing ) ,  ' t r ue  be l i e f '  ( t o  be  su re  o f
something t rue) and rrat ional  bel ief '  or  rknowledger ( to be sure of
something true and to have reasons for it). The implied concept of
truth is of a correspondence-theoretical nature. We reject this concept
because of its inherent unsolvabfe problem, that it is inpossible to
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' l ^ \ /  f e . t - q  á l ó n n q i d e  o r r r  h e l i e f s  o r  n r o n o q i l - i ó n s  j - ó . ó m n ^ r ê  t h e m  -  W e
afways approach real i ty  f rom our concepts and have got  no rbare facts l
to compare our bel- iefs wi th.
The conceptual-  feature ' t ruth '  is  not  needed in the concepL of  know-
' I e d o e  
n r e s e n t  i n  f h e  t r i a d i c  n h i I o s o n h v  o f  e d u c a t i o n .  t s u t  i t l s
n e c e s s a r y  t o  d i s t i n g u Í s h  ' b e l i e f '  a n d  ' k n o w l e d g e '  ( i . e . ,  a  b e l i e f  f o r
w h Í c h  y o u  h a v e  r e a s o n s ) .  O p p o s i t e  t o ' b e l i e f ' ,  r k n o w l e d g e '  i s  n o t
cha rac t . e r i zed  by  ce r t a i n t y ,  bu t  by  unce r t a i n t y :  ( t o  be  w Í1 I i ng )  t o
discuss the reasons that  support  the bel ief  in quest ion and to abandon
or change that  bel ief  i f  there turn out  to be (new, bet ter)  reasons
for  such abandonment or  change. What makes a reason a good one cannot
: ' .  -  
" _ : \ / ê r q a l  w : r r  c n r  a 1  l  q n r f q  o f  k n n w l e d a e  T t  i Sr q a  w q j  ^ r r v w r L u Y L .  f
demonsLrated t .hat  the quest ion what is  rat ional  ( to th ink,  to do) must
al -víays be judqed in actual  s i tuat ions,  regarding an actual  problem of
a certa in k ind -  \4r i thout  having ready-made cr i ter ia avai fabfe.
In th is concept of  knowledge intersubject iv i ty  p lays a leading part ,
n o i  a s  a  s r r n n l i e r  o f  c r i t e r i a .  b r r t  a s  t h ê  n l a c e  f o r  í i i s c u s s i o n .  A
necessary condi t ion of  th is d iscussion and of  the at t i tude of  uncer-
ta inty is  that  the gul f  between subject  and object  is  unabr idgeable:
readiness to d iscussion presupposes that  one is  a l - ive to the fact  that
o n e r q  q r r h - i e f f i l / ê  e o n ^ ^ - r l ^ - ^  r ^  - ^ +  ^ ^ i - ^ i í l ê  w i j - l r  r p a l i f r z  ' l ' h e  f e v e f s ev r r e  r  J u I J U  P e r v r r -  r e r r  r s q r r u y .  r
of the acknowledgement that  a l l -  knowfedge is subject ively I imi ted and
F ó h È - + i r r ^  i -  + L ^  i - c i a h l -  f h ^ l -  l - h ê  ^ l - \ i ê - f  l r o : l i + r r t  a v i c l - c  i n d ê n ê n í l ê n f -L c I r u q L I v c r  r r r J + J r r L  \ ! L q 4 ! u f l  e ^ r r u J  r r r e e y L r r u u r r L
Iy  of  that  knowledge.
The idea that  educat ion must be dist inguished f rorn other k inds of
inf l -uence by means of  the dist inct ion between the acquis i t ion of  be-
is to be found in works off a s l s  a r r u  L r l e  a u ! : l u f s r  ^ r r v w r c u 9 Y ,
t he  I i ng .u i s t i c  ph i l osophe rs  o f  educa t i on  H i r s t ,  Pe te r s  and  Sche f f l e r
as wel l -  as in works of  the Dutch phi losopher of  educat ion rmelman. I t
is  our opin ion that  their  concept of  knowledge is bound up wi th
- - + r ^ - ^ r r + , .  - ^  ^ -  ^ - f h f ^ h ^ l n n i n > l  f ê à f r r ' ê  í u r h i a h  i c  - ^ m h ê n r ê Á  r r n n n  i nl o L I U r l d r I L y  é >  a l r  q l l L l l ! u P U f U V f L a a  l s a L u ! e  s  u y v r r  r r r
q ê . t i ^ n  Á )  : n Á  u r i f h  a  n o s i t i o n  i n  e t h i c s  í q e e t i o n  ? )  -  a  n r i m i t i v e
m n r e l i + r r  i c  c h : r r r l a v i r y a à  l - r r z  i r r d a a m o n i .  i n  + h ê  l i a h +  a f  { . h a  c n m m r r n i f r ru v ! q r r u f
code, víhereas the ethics of  a second stage can be cal fed rat ional :  here
one judges 'universal izabfer .  The nature of  the lat ter  noral  judgment
is d iscussed. A ut i l i tar ian supplement to the formal  pr incip le of
r r n i v e . s a l i z a b i l i f . v  i s - i r r d o e d  t o  b e  s r r n e r  - ^ ' -  ^ - - -  ^ - h e r
- r  J u s y l s  L v  ! e  J q y L t r  a >  1 5  a r r y  u u .
cr i ter ion that  would give substant ia l  gr ip to moral  judgement.  I t  wi l l
a lways be necessary to examine the actual  context  of  act ion on re levant
character is t ics and to judge what,  in that  s i tuat ion,  is  worth pursuing.
I t  is  impossÍble to seÈ up a general  standard for  moral  goodness.
Chapter fV
In th is l -asc chapter we discuss a topic that  is  educat ional- Iy qui te
r ê l ê r ' a n l -  í i f  l - h e f  i  - - r ! L  . - q  o n  a  t r i a d i c  e o n c e o t  o fr >  t  v r r e
educat ion) ,  v í2.  the curr iculum. We do nothing more than touch on
aspects of  the problem of  curr iculum-development.  Thus an impression
is gÍven of  a complex f Íe ld that  can only be charted in a large inLer-
d i sc i p l i na r y  f o l l ow -up  i nves t i ga t i on .
IÁIê  ^ ên:r f  f rnm l -hp àt fêmnfq of  Hirsf  and PheniX tO make a fundanental
d ist Ínct ion between forms of  knowledqe for  the sake of  a wel l -balanced
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curr iculum of  l iberal  educat io
dist inct  forms of  knowledge th
' i  c  a h > r : n f  o r i  z a r l  l - r r r  c n o c  i  F i  n  r
and test ing.  I f  educat ion mean
i t  i s  necessa ry  t o  i n i t i a t e  t h
knowledge, in which rat ional i t
Two problematical candidates f
ê a f h ê f i c c  : n Á  r o l  i n i
- . . -  - - - - r - o n ,  a r e  c o
u r a  c a n n l l l r l ê  / f ê n t ^ t - i r r a l r r \  t - h : f
we consider esthet ic  educat ion
- ^ ^ ^ j L 1 ^  . . ^  r . . r - ^  ' h a t  t h e  i nP v - - ! ! r e r  w c  J u u g s  u
a n d ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  n o t  a  p e d a g o g i
^ ^  Í n i t i a t i oy v 5 - r u f s ,  L r r v u 9 r r ,  c 5
ce i ved  as  (h i s t o r i ca l ,  an th rop
phenomenon.
Furthermore at tent ion is  paid
Iog i co -ph i l osoph i ca l  aspec t s  o
+ h ê  d r 1 ê c f  i n n c  n f  t t h a n  f  ^  n r ê c ê
quest ion ,4ou know. ledge is best
imno r i aneP-  Tn  l - hê t  connec t i on
relevant ,  for  example:  do chi l
in terested or  mot ivated? What
interests be taken into accoun
made on the re lat ion of  learni
and  i n t e res t s .  Some  poss ib i f i t
Ium integrat ion are discussed
Besides the advantages of  an 1.
:  q n a n i f i c  d : n a a r  n f  i i  i c  p m n
forms of  knowledge, by which r
seeming reasoning.
Not the psychofogical  aspects
relatedness to phi losophical  c
Pedagogical ly  just i f ied curr ic '
sel f  in  weighing such diveïgen
educat ional  pract ice.
curriculum of liberal education. The assunption is that there exist
distinct forms of knowledge that cannot be reduced to each other. Each
is characterized by specific concepts and specific modes of reasoning
and Ëesting. ïf education means initiating children into rationality,
it Ís necessary to initiate them into all those dífferent forms of
knowledge, in wtr:-ctr rationality nanifests itself in a specific way.
ï\^io problematical- candidates for the status of rform of knowledqet, ví2.
esthetics and religion, are coÍnrnented upon. OnIy concerning religi-on
we conclude (tentatively) that it should be withheld this status. While
we consid.er  esthet ic  educat ion ( i ,ê. ,  in i t ia t ion into esthet ics)
possible, v/e judge that the initiation into religion is an irrational
and, therefore, not a pedagogtical- matter. Religious education is
possible, though, as initiation into knowledge about reLíc1ion, con-
ceived as (hÍstorical, anthropological, etc.) knowledge of a human
phenomenon.
Furthermore attention is paid to the relation of psychological and
logico-philosophical aspects of thoughts about the curriculurn. Besides
the questions of. uhen to present subject-matter and in ahat order,, Eine
question hou knowledge is best presented and acquired is of great
importance. In that connection certain psychologi-cal questions are
relevant, for example: do children learn better when they are
interested or motivated? Víhat does interest children and how can these
interests be taken into account in the curricuhn? Some remarks are
made on the relation of learning and knowledge to childrents experience
and. interests. Some possibilities and difficul-ties concerning curricu-
lum integration are discussed in rel-ation to children's experience.
Besides the advantages of  an interdisc ip l inary approach ( 'projects ' ) ,
a specific danger of it is emphasized: blurred borderlines between
forms of knowledge, by which rationality gets dÍstorted in undisciplÍned
seeming reasoning.
Not the psychological aspects as such are elucidated, but their complex
relatedness to philosophical characteristics of (forms of) knowledge.
Pedagogically justified curriculurn development can only manifest it-
self Ín weighing such divergent data in their relative importance for
educational practice.
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